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Contract
Lore
Robert A. Hillman
Editor’s Note: This article is an abridged version of an
article that appeared in The Journal of Corporation
Law (vol. 27-4) and appears here with permission. For
the present purpose, most endnotes have been omitted.
First, let me explain the title of this essay. Folklore
constitutes “the traditional beliefs, legends, cus-
toms, etc., of a people”1 and “represents a people’s
image of themselves.”2 I want to write about some
of the “traditional beliefs,” or principles, of con-
tract law that “contracts people”—judges, lawyers,
and scholars who apply and write about contract
law—employ so routinely and confidently that the
principles shed light on how we perceive contract
law today. What makes these principles so interest-
ing is that none of them is even close to true; and,
when pressed, most contracts people would admit
it. I want to investigate why contracts people in-
voke these “traditional beliefs and legends” even
though they are, in reality, nothing more than
contract lore.
This essay examines three examples of contract
lore. First, contracts people do not hesitate to de-
clare that the purpose of expectancy damages is to
“put the injured party in as good a position as if
the contract were performed.”3 But the injured
party cannot recover prejudgment interest,
attorney’s fees, unforeseeable consequential dam-
ages, uncertain losses, and so on. Consequently,
expectancy damages virtually never put the injured
party in as good a position as if the contract were
performed. Second, contracts people maintain that
the reasons for a breach, whether willful, negligent,
or unavoidable, are irrelevant to the rules of per-
formance and remedies. However, the reasons for a
breach matter mightily, including in how courts
determine whether a party has materially breached,
the formula for determining damages, and the
availability of restitutionary relief. Third, contracts
people recite how contract formation and interpre-
tation focus on the parties’ actual intentions and
assent, despite the fact that contract enforcement
does not depend on intention and assent at all.
Instead, enforcement focuses on whether a prom-
isee reasonably believed the promisor intended to
contract, and on what constitutes a reasonable
interpretation of the language of a contract.
My goal here is not to reveal these dichotomies,
which constitute open secrets. Nor do I take
issue with the explanations for the manner in
Mephistopheles offers a
contract for total
worldly knowledge in
exchange for Faust’s
soul. Undated color
lithograph illustration
from Faust (1808 and
1832) by Goethe.
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which contract law actually operates, although
this essay does contain some discussion and
evaluation of these explanations. My principal
aim is to investigate what, in the aggregate, the
existence of contract lore tells us about the nature
of contract law in this new century. I posit that a
better understanding of contract lore leads to a
clearer comprehension of contract law.
I. Examples of Contract Lore
EXPECTANCY DAMAGES
The stated goal of expectancy damages is to make
the injured party whole. Most analysts explain the
expectancy approach as the best method of creating
incentives for parties to contract and to rely on
their contracts. For example, under an expectancy
damages regime, parties can rely on their contracts,
believing either that the other party will perform or
that compensation for non-performance will put
the injured party in the same position as perfor-
mance. Setting the damages measure any lower
than expectancy would undermine this incentive to
rely. Granting recoveries greater than expectancy
damages, such as punitive damages, would discour-
age parties from entering contracts in the first place
because they would fear having to pay a penalty,
even for an inadvertent breach. Such a fine would
also constitute an unjust windfall to the injured
party.
This (and other) rationale for
expectancy damages is subject to
debate. Whatever the reasons
behind the expectancy approach,
contracts people continue to
affirm that the goal of expectancy
damages is to make injured par-
ties whole. The reality is dramatically different. A
large set of remedial rules limits the recovery of
injured parties, often to well below expectancy. For
example, in our legal system, parties usually must
pay their own lawyers and can rarely recover pre-
judgment interest. These impediments, of course,
are the costs of litigation and apply to all areas of
the law. More specific to contract law, injured
parties cannot recover unforeseeable or difficult-to-
prove damages, even though these are often real
and large. In addition, courts typically compute
damages objectively, thereby ignoring a party’s
special circumstances, including emotional distress
and sentimental value.
The failure of expectancy damages to make
injured parties whole is not the world’s best-kept
secret; many theorists have recognized this reality
and have adduced reasons to explain it. One obvi-
ous reason is that the expectancy goal runs into
institutional counter-policies. We do not want to
discourage parties from exercising their right to a
day in court by making them liable for the other
party’s legal fees. We do not want to license courts
to award baseless recoveries, so we require injured
parties to prove their damages with some precision.
Another reason is the existence of contradictory
substantive policies. For example, we want to avoid
discouraging people from making contracts because
they have a fear (rational or not) of inordinate
liability. We also want to encourage promisees to
disclose special circumstances, so we deny them
consequential damages when the breaching promi-
sor could not foresee a particular loss and the
injured promisee did not disclose its possibility.
These and other reasons undoubtedly contribute
to the real failure of expectancy damages. My pur-
pose here is not so much to take stock of these
reasons, but to figure out why so many contracts
people persist in pronouncing that expectancy
damages make injured parties whole when the
secret is out that expectancy damages do no such
thing.
Injured parties cannot recover unforeseeable or
difficult-to-prove damages, even though these are
often real and large.
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CONDUCT OF THE BREACHING PARTY
Contracts people unhesitatingly proclaim that the
reasons for a breach, whether willful, negligent, or
unavoidable, have no bearing on determining the
rights of the contracting parties. Contract liability
is said to be “strict,” meaning that the reasons for a
breach are irrelevant. The goal is to make the in-
jured party whole, not to punish contract-breakers.
But a host of exceptions swallows up the rule, so
much so that most theorists, if pressed, concede
that the true “rule” is that the breacher’s conduct
matters a lot. For example, in construction con-
tracts, the degree of willfulness of a contractor’s
breach helps courts determine whether to grant
expectancy damages measured by the cost of repair,
or by the diminution in value
caused by the breach. Deliberate-
ness also constitutes an express
factor in determining the materi-
ality of a promisor’s breach and
whether the promisee is excused
from the contract. Even after
being excused from performance,
a promisee might have to deal further with a
contract-breaker to minimize damages, depending
on a promisor’s motive for the breach. A promisor
might also commit a bad-faith breach of contract
and therefore trigger rights in favor of the promisee
that are not expressly set forth in the contract.
Finally, courts have created “independent torts”
that arise in the contract setting, including when a
party misrepresents facts during negotiations and
recklessly performs a contract.
None of these rules should be surprising or even
very controversial. Fairness principles, such as the
“rule of reciprocity,” dictate that one should not try
to increase one’s gains at the expense of the other
party. Moreover, on moral grounds, people should
keep their promises, and unintentional breaches
deserve less moral approbation than intentional
ones. Counting the deliberateness of a breach
makes sense on instrumental grounds, as well.
Courts should deter a promisor from taking advan-
tage of the promisee’s reliance on an expected
performance or of changed circumstances that
back the promisee into a corner. By deterring such
“opportunistic breaches,” contract law encourages
contracting and thwarts useless wealth transfers
from an innocent party to a wrongdoer. Perhaps
most obviously, judges and juries are human be-
ings who cannot help but be influenced by the
degree of nastiness and inconsiderateness of a
breach. So it should not be a mystery why courts
account for the willfulness of a breach. The enigma
I want to address is not why judges pay attention
to a promisor’s conduct, but why more contracts
people cannot bring themselves to repudiate the
dictum that the reasons for a breach do not matter.
CONTRACT FORMATION AND INTERPRETATION
Judicial decisions almost inevitably contain lan-
guage suggesting the primacy of the parties’
intentions and the importance of enforcing their
actual agreements. This should not be surprising.
The understood purpose of contract law is to
facilitate people’s freely-made private exchange
transactions.
In reality, however, actual intentions and agree-
ments hardly matter in cases that get to court.4
Instead, courts apply an objective theory of forma-
tion and interpretation that enforces contracts
based on apparent, not real, intentions. If a prom-
isee reasonably and honestly believed the promisor
intended to contract, the promisor may be bound
even though the promisor did not intend to con-
tract. Moreover, a court may enforce the
reasonable meaning of a contract term even
though the promisor actually understood the term
Judges and juries are human beings who cannot
help but be influenced by the degree of nastiness
and inconsiderateness of a breach.
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differently. Judge Learned Hand
saw this as early as the turn of the
last century:
A contract has, strictly speaking,
nothing to do with the personal,
or individual, intent of the par-
ties. … If … it were proved by twenty bishops
that either party, when he used the words, in-
tended something else than the usual meaning
which the law imposes on them, he would still
be held, unless there were mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort.5
Notwithstanding the staying-power of Judge
Hand’s prose, most decisions are chock-full of
“intent of the parties” language. Most courts say
one thing about individual intentions and do an-
other.
The objective approach to contract formation
and interpretation is not hard to explain. It pro-
tects a promisee’s reasonable reliance on the
promisor’s manifestation of intent. If a promisor
jokingly, mistakenly, or insincerely creates the
impression that she intends to contract according
to particular terms and her conduct induces the
promisee to rely on those terms to her detriment,
contract law protects the promisee.
What still needs explaining is why so many
contracts people persist in presenting contract law
as if subjective intentions and actual agreements
matter, when they do not. We now turn to this
question, as well as to why contracts people persist
in pronouncing other instances of contract lore.
II. The Meaning of Contract Lore
Contract law does not make injured parties whole.
It punishes deliberate contract-breakers and it
enforces contracts that a party did not intend to
make. Why do contracts people persist in saying
otherwise?
UNSATISFACTORY EXPLANATIONS
There are many unsatisfactory explanations for the
existence of contract lore. First, Part I shows that
we cannot explain contract lore on the basis that
the pronouncements are generally true but subject
to a series of exceptions. For example, expectancy
damages virtually never make an injured party
whole, so it would be difficult to maintain that, as
a general rule, they do, and that they do not only
when an exception applies. In addition, to establish
liability, contract law never requires an actual intent
to contract, so we cannot argue that contract law
requires intent except in certain circumstances.
Moreover, we cannot simply say that contract
lore is holdover dicta from a time when it was true,
before a series of exceptions effectively swallowed
up the rule. For example, I would wager that delib-
erate breaches have always had ramifications and
expectancy damages have never made the injured
party whole.
Contract lore also constitutes more than a clever
use of legal fictions, at least according to the com-
mon use of that term. “Legal fiction” usually
denotes a judicial assumption made consciously to
facilitate the development of a legal principle de-
signed to achieve a particular instrumental goal.
Judges employ legal fictions to achieve ends in
order to maintain the law’s stability and certainty.
In this sense, claims that expectancy damages
make an injured party whole, that the reasons
for breach do not matter, and that contract law
enforces the parties’ intentions do not constitute
legal fictions because these precepts do not help
develop subsidiary coherent legal principles for the
purpose of achieving an end. Moreover, lawmakers
typically pronounce legal fictions with the under-
Contract law does not make injured parties whole. It
punishes deliberate contract-breakers and it enforces
contracts that a party did not intend to make.
12 Cornell Law Forum
standing that they are not based in reality, whereas
people invoke contract lore most often with the
view that it is an accurate description of current
contract law.
In fact, because most contracts people appear to
believe in the veracity of contract lore (at least until
reminded otherwise), we can rule out another
instrumental explanation for contract lore. Con-
tracts people are not deliberately attempting to
create a chasm between the perception of contract-
ing parties of the governing rules (“I will be made
whole if the other party
breaches”) and judicial decision-
making norms (“Judges can limit
the remedy to achieve a just re-
sult”) for the purpose of achieving
greater certainty in the law with-
out sacrificing individual justice.
Further, contract lore does not
always lend itself to certain results
and contract law is not always consistent with fairer
decision-making. For example, the value of a
promise is not always easy to measure, so the con-
tract lore that injured parties can recover the value
of their expectancy does not necessarily clearly
guide transactors. Nor does a contract-law prin-
ciple, such as denying emotional distress damages,
always lead to fairer results.
Because contract lore is not always certain in
application and often constitutes poor advice to
contracting parties, I also doubt that we can ex-
plain it as a set of heuristics or shortcuts developed
by transactional lawyers to simplify their advice to
their clients. Because the reasons for breach matter,
for example, lawyers advising otherwise would
jeopardize their clients’ interests (recall that a will-
ful breacher may be liable for greater damages or
even an independent tort), not to mention possibly
commit legal malpractice.
Finally, with respect to what contract lore is not,
I do not believe it constitutes evidence of a con-
spiracy among contract “elites” to favor one class of
contractors over another. The problem with a
conspiracy explanation for contract lore is the
difficulty of detecting a unitary instrumental pat-
tern to the various pronouncements. Decisions
applying the expectancy damages formula but
failing to make the injured party whole, or declar-
ing a refusal to “punish” a contract-breaker but
taking into account the reasons for a breach, or
calling for a “meeting of the minds” but ultimately
applying an objective test of assent, do not over
time uniformly appear to favor one class of parties
over another.6 A conspiracy in these circumstances
would be hard to prove.
A MORE SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION
So what is going on here? In my view, contract lore
represents contracts people’s aspirations—their
strong preference for how contract law should
operate if realities did not preclude it. In an ideal
world of freedom and justice, a legal approach to
exchange transactions would enforce parties’ actual
agreements freely made by parties with equal bar-
gaining power and information. People would not
inadvertently become obligated under a contract.
Injured promisees of enforceable contracts would
receive performance or its equivalent in damages.
The reasons for breach would be irrelevant because
injured parties would be made whole. Liability for
expectancy damages would be a sufficient punish-
ment for nasty contract breakers. But the real
world, filled with practical and substantive hurdles,
does not allow for this model of contract law.
The chasm between aspirations and reality is, of
course, not unusual. Political candidates include in
In an ideal world of freedom and justice, a legal
approach to exchange transactions would enforce
parties’ actual agreements freely made by parties
with equal bargaining power and information.
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their platforms many campaign pledges that the
realities of governing make impossible to keep.
Sales people puff their products’ quality despite the
reality that the goods are less than perfect. Con-
tracts people also portray a version of contract law
that differs from reality because they are describing
our aspirations for contract law, not the hard
truths. But the motive for the pronouncements of
politicians and sales personnel is, at least in part,
personal gain, which sets them apart from the
creators of contract lore. Unlike politicians and
salespeople, contracts people are not trying to “sell”
the system for direct or indirect personal gain by
encouraging prospective contractors to place too
much faith in contract law.
The psychological phenomenon most
implicated in what I am describing is cognitive
dissonance. People have a tendency to strive for a
consistency of beliefs, which often leads them to
believe things that are not true and to avoid con-
flicting information. This tendency may be
especially strong concerning people’s “core val-
ues.”7 When people detect a dissonance between
their values and reality, they try to suppress the
inconsistency and the urge to do so is very strong.
No less a figure than Freud saw the relationship
between this tendency and a people’s folklore: “In
the origin of the traditions and folklore of a people,
care must be taken to eliminate from memory
such a motive as would be painful to the national
feeling.”8
Lon Fuller, in his description of the judicial
construct of “apologetic or merciful fictions”9 (dif-
ferent than the “legal fiction” discussed above), also
addressed the urge of people to suppress inconsis-
tencies. He saw in the criminal-law fiction that
“everyone knows the law” an effort to “apologize”
for the difficult reality that the law often punishes
people who do not understand they are breaking
the law.10
As we can see from Fuller’s criminal-law ex-
ample (and is otherwise obvious), aspirational
descriptions of legal principles that gain legitimacy
over time are not peculiar to contract law. But
cognitive dissonance may be especially strong in
this realm because the ideals of freedom of contract
and economic liberty are fundamental American
values, and exchange constitutes the core element
of our economy. The realities of implementing a
contract legal system deter us from achieving these
goals, but we want to believe that we have achieved
them. And thinking and writing about these
aspirations reinforces our belief in their truth. As
a Critical Legal Studies writer once pointed out,
“Once we decide … that we should ordinarily
bolster a private sphere of free action … we come
to believe that we will find such a sphere out in the
world.”11 In short, contract lore, as with other
folklore, constitutes an “escape mechanism” that
allows legal thinkers and lawmakers to envision a
better system than exists in reality.12
“Signed, Sealed, and Delivered”
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III. Ramifications
What are the ramifications of the prevalence of
contract lore? Some extant theories of contract law,
such as efficient breach, must be rethought because
they are based on contract lore, not contract law.
According to the efficient breach theory, contract
law should encourage breach when the breacher
can gain enough from breaching to pay the injured
party expectancy damages and still come out ahead.
A fundamental premise of the efficient breach
theory, however, is that the expectancy measure of
recovery makes the injured party whole. If this is
not true, the theory falls with it.
The chasm between contract law and lore has
practical implications as well. As already noted, if
the reasons for breach matter, lawyers should care-
fully reconsider the nature of the advice they dole
out to clients concerning whether and when to
breach a contract. If people can be held contractu-
ally liable without intending to contract, lawyers
should also carefully explain to their clients the
kinds of bargaining and negotiation tactics that
might lead to contractual liability, regardless of
their intent to contract. More fundamentally, law-
makers should review the efficacy of rule-of-law
norms as applied to exchange transactions, such as
certainty and clarity of law, to consider whether
more needs to be done to ensure that contract law
is not misleading.
Most important, reformers should resist the
urge to believe, based on the prevalence of contract
lore, that we already have an ideal contract-law
system. Instead, to improve contract law, contracts
people should rethink the relationship of internal
contract rules and principles to each other and the
relationship of contract principles to external rules.
Questions such as whether injured parties should
recover emotional distress damages; whether the
requisites for consequential damages recoveries of
certainty and foreseeability should be relaxed;
whether the willfulness of breach should play a
greater or lesser role in contract doctrine; whether
contract damages should better reflect the objec-
tive reasons for enforcing a contract; and whether
contracting parties should continue to pay their
own legal fees, should not be cast aside on the
misleading assumption that contract law has al-
ready satisfactorily resolved these issues. In short,
the paramount danger of the complacent accep-
tance of contract lore is that it licenses lawmakers
to escape unpleasant realities that require atten-
tion.
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